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BASIC INCOMPATIBILITIES BETWEEN EVOLUTIONARY AND
BEHAVIORAL ARCHAEOLOGY
Michael J. O'Brien, R. Lee Lyman, and Robert D. Leonard

Schiffer (1996) recently proposed that, despite some incompatibilities, considerable common ground exists between behav-

ioral archaeology and evolutionary, or selectionist, archaeology. He concludes that there is no fundamental reason why the
two approaches cannot work in concert to explain human behavioral change. There are, howev'et; several important reasons

Vwhy the thwo programs, at least as currently conceived, cannot work together in any thoroughly integrated frishion. Although
both programs employ inference, behavioral archaeology conflates the distinct roles of configurational and immanent properties, searches for nomothetic answers to questions about human behaviot; overlooks historical contingency when inferring

and explaining the nature of past behavior, and in some cases seems to frill back on vitalism as the mechanism of change.
Evolutionary archaeology employs immanent properties inferentially, explicitly acknowledges the importance of the historical contingencies of configurational properties, explains human behavior as being time- and spacebound, and calls upon

selection and drift (transmission) as the mechanisms of change. Any attempt to integrate the tiwo approaches must begin by
addressing these basic differences.

Schiffer (1996) recientemente ha propuesto que, a pesar de algunas incompatibilidades, existen considerables puntos en comnin

entre la arqiueologfa conductual y la arqueologfa evolucionista, o seleccionista. Conclutye que no existen razones findametales
por las que estas dos perspectivas no puedan trabajar en conjunto para explicar los cambios del comportamiento hurmano.
Existen, a pesar de todo, varias razones importantes por lo cual estas dos escuelas, al menos comno se les ha concebido hasta

ahora, no pueden trabajarjuntas bajo ningfin planteamniento integrado. Aunque las dos escuelas emplean inferencias, la arqueologfa conductual conjuga el papel distintivo de las propiedades configuracionales e imnanentes, busca respuestas nomoteticas a
las preguntas sobre el comportamiento humano, pasa por alto las contingencias hist6ricas al inferir y explicar la naturaleza del
comportamiento pasado, y en algunas casos parece recaer en el vitalismo como mecanismo del cambio. La arqueologfa evolucionista emplea inferencialmente las propiedades inmanentes, reconoce explicitamente la importancia de las contingencias

hist6ricas en la conflguraci6n de las propiedades, explica el comportamniento humano como finico en un tiempo y espacio de
minado, y considera a la selecci6n y la transmisi6n como los mecanismos responsables del cambio. Cualquier intento de integrar estas dos escuelas debe comenzar por resolver estas diferencias ba'sicas.

R ecently, Schiffer (1996) pointed out what

take a behavioral approach to understanding the

he saw as specific areas of concordance

archaeological record. He also has been more than

between evolutionary archaeology and

accommodating in allowing evolutionists to pub-

behavioral archaeology, positing that "there is no

lish in journals and series that he edits; thus he has

fundamental reason why these two programs can-

had to read not only the manuscripts submitted but

not work in concert to achieve the goal of explain-

also the reviews solicited during the editorial

ing behavioral (or evolutionary) change in human

process. As a result, he has more than a passing

societies" (Schiffer 1996:643). Schiffer is the

familiarity with evolutionary archaeology, and

prime architect of the behavioral archaeology pro-

hence his observations of possible overlap

gram (Schiffer 1995a) and, together with col-

between it and behavioral archaeology are worth

leagues and students at the University of Arizona

considering in detail.

(e.g., Reid et al. 1974, 1975; Skibo et al. 1995), has

We agree with some of Schiffer's observations

produced the majority of articles and books that

and arguments, but disagree with others. The
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points of disagreement underscore deep differ-

1992a, 1992b). One must, therefore, to some

ences between the two approaches. Both evolu-

degree interpret his writings and fill in apparent

tionary and behavioral archaeology seek to explain

gaps. We are aided in this task by our collabora-

humankind's past, and in some cases the data

tions with him (e.g., Dunnell and Leonard 1998;

requirements are the same (O'Brien and Holland

Lyman et al. 1997; O'Brien and Dunnell 1998),

1995b), but there are significant differences in

yet our collective view does not precisely mirror

epistemology, several of which are well discussed

Dunnell's. Nor should it necessarily do so. But we

in Schiffer's paper. Hence, we address them only

agree with Dunnell that "one cannot point to a

in passing and focus primary attention on meta-

complete and robust theory [of evolutionary

physical differences between evolutionism and

archaeology] at this point in time .... [T]here are

behavioralism-differences that at present cannot

still important theoretical issues that require reso-

be resolved given the contrasting manner in which

lution" (Dunnell 1989:42). Biological evolution-

behavioralists and evolutionists construct their

ary theory cannot simply be lifted wholesale from

explanations of the past.

that realm and applied to sherds, post molds, and

History, Evolutionary Archaeology, and
Behavioral Archaeology

arrowheads, just as Darwin's theory could not be
lifted from On the Origin of Species and applied
wholesale to the fossil record.

Schiffer focuses the majority of attention on the

These various facts result in Schiffer commit-

work of Dunnell, correctly claiming that evolu-

ting what we view as errors. His description of

tionary archaeology "had its proximate roots in

Dunnell's (1989) discussion of waste behavior-

[Dunnell's] writings ... especially his 1980 paper

specifically the Woodland-period mortuary cults

in Advances in Archaeological Method and

of the eastern United States that left behind highly

Theory" (Schiffer 1996:646). The 1980 paper to

visible burial mounds as being "almost as

which Schiffer refers (Dunnell 1980) was

behavioral as [a discussion written by] behav-

Dunnell's (1996a:x) "second major foray into evo-

ioralists" (Schiffer 1996:650) is a case in point.

lution and sociobiology," the first having been a

Dunnell (1989:46-49) stated explicitly what the

conference paper presented in 1978 (Dunnell

limitations were of what he was doing.

1996b). Other papers written late in the 1970s

Evolutionary archaeology provided only a "gross"

show the growing influence of Darwinism on

understanding of the existence of "waste," and his

Dunnell's thinking (e.g., Dunnell 1978; Dunnell

discussion only served to exemplify the sorts of

and Wenke 1980). There are two points here. First,

insights that might result from use of evolutionary

Dunnell's thinking was not fully developed in the

theory. The scenario provided was thus of "lim-

1970s the Advances paper was written, as

ited value" and only suggested the "potential" of

Dunnell (1996a:x) put it, by a "neophyte." Second,

evolutionary archaeology to help explain the

Dunnell has yet to produce a thorough program-

archaeological record; in particular, it indicated

matic statement on how to implement his version

which variables were relevant to such scenarios.

of evolutionary archaeology. What Dunnell

Schiffer probably would argue that when fleshed

(1996a:xi) takes as his "best" piece of evolutionary

out, the scenario would be behavioral, and he

archaeology work is an exploration of artifact vari- would be correct, since human behaviors created
ation (Dunnell and Feathers 1991)-an extremely

the waste. No evolutionary archaeologist ever

critical factor within evolutionary archaeology that

argued otherwise (O'Brien and Holland 1995b).

has prompted him to remark on more than one

More importantly, Dunnell (1989) emphasized

occasion (e.g., Dunnell 1989:46) that archaeology

that (1) if it is granted that artifacts are part of th

must develop units of measurement and descrip-

phenotype, then one must be clear on what makes

tion commensurate with theory.

up an artifact; (2) relevant variables had not yet

Most of Dunnell's published statements either

been described within an evolutionary theory

are directed to particular issues within the larger

applicable to cultural phenomena such as arti-

context of the evolutionary archaeology program

facts; (3) appropriate units for measuring relevant

(e.g., Dunnell 1995) or are so general that little

variables in the empirical realm had not been

critical detail is included (e.g., Dunnell 1989,

identified and described; and (4) identifying both
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owing its existence to heritability), natural selec-

with theory building. Numerous efforts by many

tion (a mechanism of change), a transmission

individuals have been made in these directions

mechanism (which itself is a source of new vari-

subsequent to publication of Dunnell's article (see

ants), invention/innovation (another source of new

references in O'Brien 1996b), but many issues

variants), and heritability (denoting continuity,

have not been resolved.

What Is Evolutionary Archaeology?
The premise underlying Darwinian evolutionary

such that similarity is homologous). The last

ensures that we are examining change within a lineage rather than merely convergence, in which
case similarity is of the analogous sort.

archaeology is, as Schiffer (1996:646) points out,

Within paleobiology, some of the best historical

that objects occurring in the archaeological record,

studies were written by Simpson (e.g., 1937a,

because they were phenotypic, were shaped by the

1937b, 1937c). Some might question why we refer

same evolutionary processes as were the somatic

to such "ancient writings," but what Simpson had

features of their makers and users. This is a short-

to say in the 1930s and 1940s is as relevant today

hand way of saying that the possessors of the

as it was six decades ago (Gould 1980; LaPorte

objects were acted on by evolutionary processes.

1983). Some debate has recently arisen as to

Under this perspective, evolution is viewed as the

whether a Simpson-like view is the most appropri-

differential persistence of discrete variants

ate one to adopt in paleobiology (e.g., Gould

(Dunnell 1980:38), regardless of the scale of "vari-

1995a, 1995b), and some have, to be sure, adopted

ant" being defined. Evolutionary archaeology

(allegedly [see LaPorte 1983]) different views

involves (1) measuring variation that is, dividing

(e.g., Gould and Eldredge 1993), but the important

it into discrete sets of empirical units (groups)

point is that we view these debates as particularly

using ideational units (classes); (2) tracking vari-

germane to what we see as the central objective of

ants through time and across space to produce a

evolutionary archaeology.

historical narrative about lineages of particular

We favor definitions of evolution such as "any

variants; and (3) explaining the differential persis-

net directional change or any cumulative change in

tence of individual variants comprising lineages in

the characteristics of organisms or populations

particular time-space contexts. Selection is a key

over many generations in other words, descent

concept in evolutionary theory, though in modern

with modification. It explicitly includes the origin

Darwinian evolutionary theory, selection is only

as well as the spread of alleles, variants, trait val-

one evolutionary process that works on variation.

ues, or character states. Evolution may occur as a

Few would doubt that selection is the greatest

result of natural selection, genetic drift, or both"

molder of lineages, but it still acts in tandem with

(Endler 1986:5; see also Richards 1992). Thus,

other processes such as drift and mutation.

trait variation and inheritance are required for evo-

Selection is the mechanism that drives much evo-

lutionary change to occur, but fitness differences

lutionary change and is external to the system

are not; the last is only required for evolution via

(organisms or cultures) itself. Within Darwinian

natural selection. Such a definition explicitly

theory, it serves as a testable explanation of change

incorporates both style and function (sensu

(Leonard and Reed 1993).

Dunnell 1978) as kinds of variants of archaeologi-

Evolutionary archaeology has many parallels to

cal phenomena. Given this definition, we prefer

modern paleobiology (Lyman and O'Brien 1998).

the methods of evolutionary study used by

It is geared toward providing Darwinian-like

Gingerich (1991), Simpson (1944, 1975), and

explanations of the archaeological record, just as

Szalay and Bock (1991) to understand the paleon-

paleobiologists explain the paleontological record.

tological record (Lyman and O'Brien 1998). We

There are two steps: first, build cultural lineages,

do not deny that what is known as punctuated

and second, construct explanations for those lin-

equilibrium (Eldredge and Gould 1972; Gould and

eages being the way they are (O'Hara 1988;

Eldredge 1993) is valuable, nor do we deny its

Szalay and Bock 1991). Both steps must employ

potential applicability to archaeology (e.g.,

concepts embedded within Darwinian evolution-

Rosenberg 1994). In part, our preference for ear-

ary theory, such as lineage (a line of development

lier methods rather than, say, those favored under
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punctuated equilibrium, resides in the much

1995b:35) seems to us little more than a holdover

greater temporal resolution of the archaeological

from Phillips's (1955:246-247) statement that

record. This is not to imply that the archaeological

"New World archaeology is anthropology or it is

record is somehow qualitatively or quantitatively

nothing." Why archaeology should be anything

more complete than the paleontological record; the

other than archaeology is never specified other

problems with both records are remarkably similar

than noting that artifacts are the products of

(see overview in Gould 1995a). But both records

humans-by Phillips, Schiffer, or anyone else who

provide something to which their respective col-

aligns with this position.

laborators dealing with living organisms-

Schiffer (1995b:24) states that the "behavioral-

whether people or fruit flies do not have access.

ist demands that historical narratives rest. . . on a

And that is, simply, time.

As Gould (1995a:4) observed, "the short time

foundation of well-confirmed behavioral principles." But he also states that constructing behav-

scale of Drosophila experiments, pigeon breeding,

ioral principles or laws "was never viewed by

and improvement of crop plants [may provide]

behavioralists as archaeology's final goal. Rather,

direct evidence for the efficacy of selective

behavioral inferences provide the basis for gener-

processes," but these processes may or may not be

ating a view of the past compatible with a particu-

applicable to "time's vastness." Gould is in part

lar theoretical stance: the behavioralist premise

arguing that Darwinian theory must be modified

that the basis of human societies is their complete

(his and Eldredge's punctuated equilibrium added)

reliance on complex and intimate relationships

to account for the whole of the paleontological

between people and artifacts. The study of such

record. The important part of Gould's message is

relationships, in all times and places, can, behav-

that we need not bother studying the fossil

ioralists maintain, lead to the creation of distinc-

record either paleontological or archaeologi-

tive social theory in archaeology" (Schiffer

cal if we can see all evolutionary processes in a

1995b:34). We have no dissatisfaction with the

petrie dish or among a group of college students.

"behavioralist premise," but there are two reasons

Evolution is historical it takes place over time

we cannot agree that constructing "behavioral the-

and contingency bound (Beatty 1995), meaning

ory to explain variation and change in human

that it is conditioned by what happened at earlier

behavior, conceived as people-artifact interactions,

points. Thus, the central objective of paleobiolo-

is archaeology's highest scientific calling"

gists and archaeologists is to determine and

(Schiffer 1995b:35). First, behavioral theory

explain the history the evolutionary lineages of

appears to be merely a set of empirical generaliza-

the phenomena they study. We believe most behav-

tions; second, artifacts, not human behavior, make

ioral archaeologists would agree with this.

up the archaeological record.

What Is Behavioral Archaeology?

Schiffer and other practitioners of behavioral

Behavioral theory is supposed to do two things:

(1) improve "behavioral inference" so that it is
"sound," thereby making the writing of narratives

archaeology claim to provide a richer and more

of behavioral history "rigorous," and (2) answer

complete picture of the past than evolutionary

"with credible theories and laws, the general ques-

archaeologists do: "[B]ehavioral theory, immature

tions raised in specific [historical] narratives"

though it remains, facilitates the fashioning of his-

(Schiffer 1995b:34). The first is accomplished by

torical narratives that are both richly contextual-

generating "lawlike statements that, along with

ized and audience friendly. More significantly, a

other kinds of information, link observations on

behavioral narrative is centered on the actual activ-

the archaeological record to behaviors of the past

ities of past people" (Schiffer 1995b:34). Certainly

(e.g., Schiffer 1972, 1976)," and by developing a

behavioral archaeology provides a picture that is

"nomothetic understanding of material culture

more anthropologically friendly, given its focus on

dynamics" (Schiffer 1995b:22). Such nomothetic

human activities, than evolutionary archaeology

principles are "required for reconstructing a

does. But to argue that "the focus of theory build-

behavioral past" (Schiffer 1995b:23) and appar-

ing in archaeology is ... on what people actually

ently constitute the basis for building behavioral

do (and did) in specific activities" (Schiffer

theory. Historical narratives are "plausible"
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because they entail "theorylike or lawlike general-

driven approach of behavioral archaeology in con-

izations" in the structure of an often-implicit

junction with the general absence of a concept of

"nomothetic apparatus" (Schiffer 1995b:28).

style, evolutionary archaeology suggests that

An example of an underlying premise of a

behavioral archaeology explanations of Swiss

behavioral theory is that "an artifact's performance

army knives will be strictly functional (e.g., Gould

characteristics cannot all achieve high values in

1997; O'Brien and Holland 1992).

every use activity" (Schiffer 1995b:29). A Swiss

Evolutionary archaeologists also wonder how

army knife can be used to do lots of things, nonethe
of reconstructions of behavioral archaeology are
tested, since they are inductions or inferences.
them "in the most effective manner," and thus this
Dunnell (1989:43-44), for example, notes that by
artifact represents "compromises in activity perfor-

mance" (Schiffer 1995b:30). The favored behav-

allowing such reconstructions, "[r]elations

between
behavior and material must be invariant if
ioral variable in this case is the transportability of
a
tool, which is "expectable when there is high user

they are to serve as timeless, spaceless rules for

mobility and limited transport capability" (Schiffer

reconstruction" (see O'Brien and Holland 1995b).

1995b:30). High mobility and limited transport

In other words, a particular structure of particular

capability are certainly behavioral, but do general-

archaeological stuff in a particular context always

ized tools always denote such behaviors?

and everywhere denotes a particular behavior. In

Behavioral theory doesn't tell us, because the

short, equifinality is not a problem for behavioral

mobility-transport capability equation is an empiri-

archaeology because, given sufficient actualistic

cal generalization founded in common sense and

research, a modem analog for every human behav-

denying any contingencies of particular behavioral

ior that has ever occurred in the past can be found.

contexts. Darwinian evolution provides a theoretical understanding of such a tool by noting that
design constraints typically result in things arti-

Common Ground

There are three areas of agreement between behav-

facts or organisms not attaining all-around opti-

ioral archaeology and evolutionary archaeology.

mality (e.g., Gans 1988, 1993; Gould 1989); that is,

First, both programs recognize the importance of

compromises are always being made. Whether

human behavior in the context of archaeology.

archaeologists and few if any evoluhigh mobility, limited transport, or some other Behavioral
factor results in the production of such a thing is his-

tionists would disagree with Mayr's (1973:388)

torically contingent what we term a historical

assertion that behavior "is perhaps the strongest

configuration (see below). Why was such a tool

selection pressure operating in the animal king-

dom." Second, as Schiffer points out, identifying
built in a particular time-space position? Evolution-

ary archaeology seeks an answer in two arenas:

and tracking variation evident in the archaeologi-

selective context and evolutionary history.

cal record is basic to evolutionary archaeology.

Behavioral archaeology comprises the recon-

But the isolation and measurement of variation is

not the purview solely of evolutionists. As one of
struction of behaviors, arranging them in a historical sequence and then explaining that sequence in

us has stated repeatedly (e.g., O'Brien and Holland

behavioral terms. Whether or not the sequence also 1995a, 1995b), when Schiffer and his colleagues

comprises a lineage in a Darwinian sense is not

and students break clay test tiles or carry out myr-

addressed by behavioral archaeology. Why?

iad other experiments in the Laboratory for

Because the critical distinction between homolo-

Traditional Technology at the University of

gous and analogous similarities is not mentioned

Arizona (e.g., Schiffer 1990; Schiffer and Skibo

in behavioral archaeology theory; thus, a historical

1987; Schiffer et al. 1994; Skibo et al. 1989; Vaz

narrative may result, but it need not be an evolu-

Pinto et al. 1987), they are carrying out the same

tionary narrative. That is, a temporal sequence may

experiments that evolutionary archaeology

be produced under the behavioral archaeology pro-

requires (e.g., Brandon 1994) in order to under-

gram, but there is no apparent attempt to ensure

stand variation in perfornance characteristics of

that it is also an evolutionary lineage or a heri-

objects found in the archaeological record. As

tability-dependent sequence (Lyman and O'Brien

O'Brien and Holland (1995b: 144) point out, tech-

1997). Further, given the empirical generalization-

nological and functional analyses of how objects
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were made and used are important in evolutionary

applying Darwin's theory to the fossil record. Each

archaeology. Explanations of past behavior "are

variable has a particular significance for determin-

derived directly from experimental evidence

ing evolutionary-that is, phylogenetic history,

viewed against the archaeological context contain-

and each has particular, theoretically founded,

ing the materials being examined. We contend that

empirical manifestations and distributions within

this kind of research agenda-one based on exper-

the fossil record. Archaeology has only Willey's

imental evidence [leading to what we here term

(1953:363) axiom that "typological similarity

mechanical inference] will allow us to begin to

[indicates] cultural relatedness." In several

understand not only the evolutionary trajectories

respects, this puts the cart before the horse, for as

of the humans responsible for the technological

Simpson (1961:69) pointed out when a similar

products but also the nature of selective regimes"

axiom was in use in paleobiology, "individuals do

(O'Brien and Holland 1995b: 144).

The third point of agreement concerns how

not belong in the same taxon because they are sim-

ilar, but they are similar because they belong to the

things in the archaeological record are viewed.

same taxon." The significance of this statement is

Basic to evolutionary archaeology is the view that

difficult to overemphasize.

artifacts represent "the hard parts of the behavioral
segment of [past] phenotypes" (Dunnell 1989:44;

Following Schiffer's reasoning, sherds are not

part of the phenotype, because a sherd has behav-

see Leonard and Jones 1987). When artifacts were

ioral relevance only when it is in the systemic con-

made and used, they were as much a part of human

text; otherwise it is trash. By the same reasoning,

phenotypes as nests and log dams are parts of bird

paleobiologists would be surprised to learn that a

and beaver phenotypes, respectively (O'Brien and

fossilized fragment of a humerus or a single tooth

Holland 1995b). Extending the phenotype

is not part of an organism's phenotype because the

(Dawkins 1990) to include nonsomatic features is,

organism is dead. Sherds have attributes temper-

as Schiffer points out, something that appeals to

ing agent, wall thickness, and so forth any of

behavioral archaeology because it emphasizes the

which, at one time or another, could have been

behaviors that result in creation of the objects. Yet

functional. Conversely, any or all could, at one

Schiffer does not follow through on the evolution-

time or another, have been functionally neutral

ary implications of this notion. He argues that

(O'Brien et al. 1994). These attributes are part of a

"evolutionary theory itself cannot be rewritten in

human's phenotype, just as the color of a mam-

archaeological context terms: sherds were not part

mal's hair as represented by a single hair follicle is

of anyone's phenotype (unless reused), yet a cook-

part of that organism's phenotype, whether or not

ing pot a systemic-context entity operationalized

the hair is attached to the living organism.

through behavioral inference was" (Schiffer

Schiffer's purely behavioral focus has turned

1996:649). Later, he (Schiffer 1996:653-654)

attention away from some of his own most astute

devotes a page and a half to discussing "Appro-

observations namely, those regarding the impor-

priate Units and Scales of Selection." The state-

tance of the scales of units on which evolutionary

ment on sherds and the later discussion of units

processes work. There are other differences

and scales are incompatible with each other from

between evolutionary and behavioral archaeology,
and we turn now to some of the most important

our perspective.

If we paraphrase one of Dunnell's (1980:88)
statements that Schiffer (1996:649) isolates, paleobiologists have made significant strides in rewrit-

ing evolutionary theory "in terms of variables that

ones.

Fundamental Differences

Those who have more than a passing familiarity

are empirical in the [fossil] record." Recall that

with the literature on evolutionary archaeology

Darwin made minimal reference to the fossil

will recognize much of the following. However,

record (see papers in Nitecki and Nitecki 1992).

given that what we discuss seems to be the major

Paleobiologists have had to develop a suite of

stumbling block to understanding this archaeology

terms some borrowed from functional biology

and how it differs from other approaches, and that

such as homolog, synapomorph, autapomorph,

critics of evolutionary archaeology (e.g., Boone

and the like-to denote the variables requisite to

and Smith 1998; Spencer 1997) fail to grasp the
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of past behaviors but also the construction of

points bear repeating. Rather than parrot what has

social-behavioral theory (Schiffer 1995b:34). But

been said before, we use somewhat different terms

where is the explanatory theory?

for critical concepts in order to make the signifi-

cance of the message apparent.

Problems with Terms and Concepts

Darwinian evolutionary theory deals with his-

Schiffer (1996:648) states that because parts of

tory the explanation of why certain organisms do

evolutionary archaeology are variously without

better than others in a particular environment

foundation, contra modem evolutionary biology,

(Mayr 1961). As a historical science, biological

these parts undermine efforts to establish a work-

evolution differs ontologically and metaphysically

able theory. Much of Schiffer's criticism has

from the ahistorical physical sciences (e.g.,

roots in terminology that has plagued archaeol-

Lewontin 1974; Mayr 1987), though the latter

ogy since the early 1960s. Archaeologists regu-

offer explanations of how organisms function. If

larly confound the concepts of theory, hypothesis,

archaeology is taken to be a historical science, the

model, and explanation with each other and with

same must hold true for it. The single most funda-

other concepts (Leonard and Reed 1996), and

mental difference between the historical and ahis-

they occasionally provide differing definitions

torical sciences resides in the studied phenomena

that range from redundant to unique.

themselves. As Ereshefsky (1992:91) points out,

Evolutionary biologists routinely grapple with

The units of evolutionary theory, taxa, are

such issues (see the journal Biology and

genealogical sequences of organisms which

Philosophy), but archaeologists exacerbate the

pass on historically acquired information. The

problem because they often do not define critical

units of chemistry and physics, on the other

terms, assuming we all subconsciously share the

hand, do not consist of such sequences of

objects. This difference affords evolutionary
theory with a distinctive form of explanation ....

same definitional perspective regarding these
complex concepts. Schiffer's use of laws, lawlike

In evolutionary biology, many (most?) of the

statements, principles, and generalizations as

similarities among the members of a taxon can

synonyms, and ideas and theory as synonyms,

be explained by those similarities being

illustrates this problem.

homologies. No such explanation is available
for the similarities found among the units of
physics and chemistry .... [Chemical and

Schiffer finds it odd that evolutionary archaeology views laws and theories as true by definition

other similarities between] chunks of gold [do]

that is, true in terms of specifying logical

not depend on the transmission of information

relationships, not in some cosmological sense. We

from one chunk of gold to another [emphasis

believe that this is odd only if one confounds the

added].

ideational realm with the phenomenological realm.

Simply put, Darwinian evolution, because it

Such is common in archaeology, where theory and

concerns heritability and continuity, comprises a

hypothesis are often used synonymously. The most

materialist ontology, which means that it views

fundamental concepts underlying Darwinian evolu-

relations between and among phenomena as time-

tionary archaeology variation, inheritance, nat-

and spacebound (Dunnell 1982; O'Brien 1996a).

ural selection, inclusive phenotype, replicative

As such, it contrasts sharply with the essentialist

success, style, function, and so on are definition-

ontology of the physical sciences. In essentialism,

ally true and relate to each other in such a way that

the "essential properties" of an object dictate

evolutionary propositions about the past can be

whether it is placed in one pile or another; varia-

constructed. It is these evolutionary propositions-

tion between and among objects is viewed as noth-

theoretical claims-about the real world that are

ing more than "annoying distraction" (Lewontin

testable. We call these hypotheses, which are

1974:5). Importantly, it is not its focus on human

derived from theory a situation wholly consistent

behavior that makes behavioral archaeology essen-

with practice in modem evolutionary biology, con-

tialistic; rather, it is the belief that human behavior tra Schiffer's claims. With this recognition, Schiffer
can be explained by inventing nomothetic-like

would no longer find it surprising that "theories

principles. Recalling the "behavioralist premise,"

have a substantial empirical content" (Schiffer

such principles allow not only the reconstruction

1996:649).
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The Case of Analogy: Immanent and

1970:8 1). Were it not for this simple fact, retrodic-

Configurational Properties

tion and prediction would be impossible, for the
cosmos would be truly random.

Earlier we indicated that the reconstruction of cul-

Immanent properties and processes are what

tural behavior, one basis of behavioral archaeol-

allow mechanical inferences to be made. The half-

ogy, is founded on what we view as the

life of 14C is an immanent property that allows us

inappropriate use of analogy. We emphasize that

to calculate radiocarbon dates; the validity of the

we are not saying that analogy is an unacceptable

radiocarbon-dating method hinges on the unifor-

form of reasoning. But the considerable space in

mitarianist assumption (analogical reasoning) that

archaeological literature devoted to discussing the

the half-life of 14C is the same, regardless of place

structure of analogical reasoning and identifying

or time. Similarly, the processes that result in bio-

its strengths and weaknesses (e.g., Simms 1992;

logical evolution genetic transmission, mutation,

Stahl 1993) suggests that a good many archaeolo-

drift, differential reproduction and survival, and

gists do not have a firm comprehension of such

selection involve immanent properties and

reasoning. Perhaps this should be expected, given

processes. The history of an evolutionary lineage

that geologists (e.g., Shea 1982) and paleobiolo-

is, however, configurational. Every fossil has "its

gists (e.g., Gould 1965), too, spend a great deal of

particular as well as its general configurational

effort describing analogical reasoning within the

properties, its significant balance of difference and

context of discussions of uniformitarianism.

resemblance [to other fossils], not only because of

Simpson's (1960, 1963, 1970) discussions are

immanent properties of its constituents and imma-

helpful in this respect, largely because he

nent processes that had acted on it, but also

because of its history, the configurational sequence
describes, in different terms, the sorts of linkages
between analogical reasoning and essentialism, as

by which these individual things arose" (Simpson

well as the different sorts of linkages between such

1963:27). Thus, "[h]istoiical events, whether in the

reasoning and materialism.

history of the earth, the history of life, or recorded

What is the significance of the ontological dis-

human history, are determined by immanent char-

tinction between immanence and configuration

acteristics of the universe [the source of laws] act-

when comparing behavioral and evolutionary

ing on and within particular configurations, and

archaeology? In Simpson's view, the significance

never by either the immanent or the configura-

is clear:

tional alone" (Simpson 1963:29).

The unchanging properties of matter and energy

[chemistry, mechanics, physics] and the like-

It is the task of the evolutionist whether study-

ing fossils, fruit flies, or sherds to keep immanent

wise unchanging processes and principles aris-

and configurational characteristics separate (Szalay

ing therefrom are immanent in the material
universe. They are nonhistorical, even though
they occur and act in the course of history. The
actual state of the universe or of any part of it at

evolutionists should ignore immanent properties; in

a given time, its configuration, is not immanent
and is constantly changing. It is contingent ...
or configurational .... History may be defined
as configurational change through time (Simpson 1963:24-25).

and Bock 1991). Note that we are not saying that
fact, we have argued just the opposite (Lyman and

O'Brien 1998; O'Brien and Holland 1990, 1995b;
O'Brien et al. 1994). Failure to keep the essential-

ist ontology and its focus on immanent properties
distinct from configurational, or historically contingent, properties plagues other disciplines such as

Simpson's "immanent" properties and

paleoecology (e.g., Lawrence 1971) a discipline

processes compose, in our terms, essentialism; his

that Schiffer (1996:650) perceives as important to

"configurational" properties are historically con-

modem evolutionary biology. But paleoecological

inference is not straightforward when the distinctingent and comprise materialism. The dictum that
tion
between immanence and configuration is not
"the present is the key to the past" holds only with

maintained (e.g., Paine 1983; Peterson 1983). Two
respect to essentialist, or immanent, properties and
processes: "What we know (or theorize) about the

examples demonstrate that Schiffer (1996:651)

immanent characteristics of the universe is derived

merges the two.

from observation of the present" (Simpson

First, Schiffer (1996:650-651) cites Thomason's
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ities as the cause of culture change is, however, to

Paleontology as an example of the use of behavioral

limit one's analysis substantially. As Steward

inference by evolutionary biologists, but if any-

(1956:72) noted more than 30 years ago: "[A] spe-

thing, "functional anatomy" is founded on imma-

cific invention is not explained by saying that man

nent properties. We assume Schiffer realizes this,

is creative." Invoking invention, specifically as it

but his focus on function leads us to suspect that he relates to intent, is to view White's (1943:339)
tends to conflate immanent and configurational

"urges, inherent in all living species, to live, to

properties. Second, Schiffer identifies the McKellar

make life more secure, more rich, more full, to

principle which specifies that in fiequently main-

insure the perpetuation of the species" as the cata-

tained activity areas, only small artifacts remain

lyst for change. Human intent is internal to the cul-

behind as primary refuse (McKellar 1983) as a

tural system and results in a vitalistic evolutionism

nomothetic principle of human behavior. Simpson

that is not testable because the conclusion regard-

provides an excellent argument against such a prin-

ing the mechanism of change is part of the theory.

ciple being a behavioral law:
A certain person's repeatedly picking up and

Appeal to intent as ultimate cause echoes the
late nineteenth-century view of Darwinian evolu-

dropping a certain stone may seem to be a
recurrent event in all essentials, but there really

tion. Between 1860 and 1900, one of the basic

is no applicable historical law. Abstraction of a

even by some of Darwin's strongest supporters-

law from such repeated events leads to a non-

for example, American botanist Asa Gray was

historical law of immanent relationships, per-

haps in this case gravity and acceleration or
perhaps of neurophysiology, and not to a historical law of which this particular person, picking
up a certain stone, at a stated moment, and
dropping it a definite number of times would be
a determinate instance [Simpson 1963:29-30].

arguments against natural selection, expressed

that it said nothing about the ultimate source of
variation. Spencer, for example, believed the problem with natural selection was that "it allowed the
individual no freedom to improve itself by its own
efforts" (Bowler 1990:171). During the early days
of processual archaeology, the role of intent was

The message here is clear: the present is the key

seriously considered by some processualists.

to the past only when immanent properties are

Flannery (1967:122), for example, observed that

involved. Despite the simplicity of what Simpson

"individuals do make decisions, but evidence of

said, some investigators and commentators (e.g.,

these individual decisions cannot be recovered by

Watson 1966) have failed to grasp its significance.

archaeologists."

Precisely the same misunderstanding exists within

We do not know how to design a valid empiri-

biological taxonomy (e.g., Mayr 1987, 1996),

cal test of stimulated variation in the prehistoric

despite its having been discussed in that context

past. This, plus the form of evolution that results

for nearly four decades (e.g., Hull 1965; LaPorte

from invoking such mechanisms as catalysts of

1997; Mayr 1959; Sober 1980).

change, has prompted us and other evolutionary

Analogy as Behavioral Inference

Schiffer's (1996:656-657) discussion of "stimu-

archaeologists to focus our efforts on areas other
than the "variety-generating processes" that
behavioral archaeology finds intriguing. Evolu-

lated variation" and the notion that "invention is

tionists have tended to concentrate on what hap-

hardly a random process," while intriguing, is par-

pens to variation after it is generated, instead of

ticularly conducive to illustrating some of the dif-

looking for laws to explain why it was generated in

ferences between nomothetic behavioral principles

the first place. It should by now be clear that such

and Darwinian evolution. In short, "stimulated

laws do not exist. There is, of course, a plethora of

variation" is simply another way of saying that

mechanisms we might call upon-diffusion,

necessity is the mother of invention. Evolutionary acculturation, invention, and the like but these

archaeology agrees that certain selective environ-

are immanent properties of how cultures work.

ments likely do stimulate more invention than oth-

Precisely how and why each of these mechanisms

ers, and invention is certainly not random except

works in particular time-space-cultural contexts is,

with respect to the operation of selection. But to

of course, configurational, or, as some (e.g., Beatty

invoke humankind's unique problem-solving abil-

1995) prefer to label it, historically contingent.
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lutionary archaeologists suggest this may, for a

time, be an empirical matter (e.g., Lipo et al. 1997;
neutral features, selection is the final arbiter of what
is transmitted and perpetuated. It is opportunistic

Neiman 1995).

and tinkers with the variation available to produce

We agree with Schiffer (1996:648) that it is

something that works (Jacobs 1977), regardless of

important to distinguish between the processes

the source of variation (O'Brien and Holland

that give rise to variation and those that result in

1995b). This point has been missed by other critics

the differential persistence of certain variants as

of evolutionary archaeology (Boone and Smith

opposed to others. In cultural systems, variation

1998; Spencer 1997). If a workable solution cannot

results in part from differences in human percep-

tion and intention. In fact, Rindos (1985, 1986)
be produced by such tinkering, the organism has little option but to buy a tombstone. If Schiffer is look-argued that if there is a genetic capacity for culing for first principles, the closest we can get is the ture, it actually is a capacity for intentional behavprinciple of contingency that what happens at

ior. Cultural systems, similar to organisms, tend to

point C is conditioned to some extent by what hap-

be overbuilt. That is, they tend to be plastic, adap-

pened at point B, which itself is conditioned by

tive systems capable of accomplishing much more

what happened at point A. This gives evolutionary

than they regularly do (Boone and Smith 1998).

lineages their stochastic appearance.

Lability was, no doubt, built by selection (Gould
1991). Efforts to ascribe a function to every

Transmission

attribute of the archaeological record fail to recog-

Citing Dunnell (1978), Schiffer (1996:648) states

nize, for example, that the human organism uses

that compared to genetic transmission of variation,only a fraction of its brain power, just as a com"cultural transmission involves different processes

puter can do much more than we ask of it. Such

and mechanisms, and their understanding may

spandrels metaphorically, architectural features

require new laws and theories." He then notes that

resulting from design requirements but with no

this statement is self-evident to behavioralists,

immediate function (Gould and Lewontin 1979;

though "selectionists have been slow to follow up

see also Gans 1988) serve as a stockpile of vari-

its implications with appropriate nomothetic

ation in some respects stylistic, or adaptively

research" (Schiffer 1996:648). This is true, but not

neutral, because they were not shaped by selection

for the reasons Schiffer implies. No one would

but rather by design requirements that may, in a

argue that the study of cultural transmission is

fluctuating selective environment, be co-opted for

unimportant. Researchers such as Boyd and

some future function (Gould and Vrba 1982).

Richerson (1985) and Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman

Herein may reside much of what evolutionary

(1981) have made significant strides in under-

archaeology terms style (Dunnell 1978).

standing the "processes and mechanisms" of cul-

Gould (1991) argues that system lability, with

tural transmission. As yet, nothing they have

particular reference to our overbuilt brains, is cru-

proposed casts doubt on the application of

cial to an evolutionary psychology. Fully in concert

Darwinian evolutionary theory to the archaeologi-

with a Darwinian viewpoint (Gans 1988; Mayr

cal record, though it has been observed that the

1991), we can propose that self-awareness is a

strides made tend not to explain why transmission spandrel, an unintended outcome of selection havoccurs the way that it does (Lyman and O'Brien

ing produced a somatic central-processing unit

1998; Sober 1992). The greatest weakness of evo-

that, in the last 30 years, has built similar units from

lutionary archaeology to date is determining how

plastic, metal, and glass. Add reading, writing, lan-

to measure transmission. Evolutionary biologists

guage, and other uniquely human or cultural attrib-

know a great deal about the processes and mecha-

utes to the list of human-associated traits, many of

nisms of genetic transmission and the appropriate

which may have begun as spandrels. If the last is

units-genes. Anthropologists are struggling with

true, then "[s]tructural consequences have out-

similar units variously termed "memes," "cultur-

stripped original bases" (Gould 1991:59). We sus-

gens," and the like, but how these are to be

pect that those archaeologists with leanings toward

detected archaeologically is only now being made

the various postprocessual programs could help us

clear. Applications of transmission models by evo-

gain significant insights here.
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This is not to say that behavioral archaeology
does not have significant things to contribute to an

Behavioral archaeology originally sought to

evolutionary theory, because it does a point we

replace culture history and cultural reconstruction

have made in the past (O'Brien and Holland

and to improve on processual archaeology. It is

1995b). Other programs, in particular evolutionary

underlain by an essentialist ontology, which holds

ecology (see papers in Maschner 1996) and post-

that human behavior, regardless of time or space,

processualism, given the latter's interest in the

has configurational properties that all members of

symbolic, also have important contributions to

the species possess. In such a view, the configura-

make. However, before a truly integrative

tional present is the key to the configurational past.

approach to the historical study of humans and

The evolutionary program is underlain by a materi-

their artifacts emerges-that is, one that investi-

alist ontology, which holds that things are always in gates the evolutionary pathways of humans and the
the process of becoming something else. In such a

groups in which they live we must make clear

historical view, the configurational present is not

what the points of contention are among the vari-

and cannot be the key to the configurational past.

ous approaches. This of necessity will dictate that

Temporal and spatial context matter a great deal.

all interested parties, ourselves included, make

Only immanent properties can be keys to the his-

sure that we understand the underlying premises of

torical particulars of the past (Lyman and O'Brien

the various approaches in detail.

1998). Scientists are free to pose whatever kinds of

questions they wish, though logic dictates that the
kinds of questions they ask be derived naturally
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